The devastating conflict where both sides have reasons to keep fighting

Sudan's ongoing civil conflict has evolved into a textbook case of structural deadlock—a situation where neither the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) nor the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) possess sufficient military advantage to achieve decisive victory, yet both retain adequate resources and motivation to sustain indefinite warfare. For European investors and entrepreneurs assessing opportunities in the broader Horn of Africa region, understanding the mechanics of this conflict is essential to risk management strategy. The current fighting, which escalated dramatically in April 2023, represents the culmination of decades of institutional fragmentation within Sudan's security apparatus. The RSF emerged from the Janjaweed militia networks that operated during the Darfur conflict, while the SAF represents the conventional military structure inherited from Sudan's post-colonial state. This historical bifurcation created two parallel power centers competing for control of state resources—a competition that inevitable escalated into armed conflict when political negotiations collapsed. The weaponization of Sudan's conflict distinguishes it from many African conflicts. Both parties have accessed consistent arms supplies: the SAF benefits from historical relationships with Russia, China, and Iran, while the RSF has reportedly acquired equipment through multiple channels, including Libyan networks and private military suppliers. This dual supply chain prevents the kind of decisive