Zimbabwe: Mnangagwa’s rivalry with VP Chiwenga spreads to provinces

Zimbabwe's political leadership is experiencing a destabilizing internal fracture that extends far beyond the capital, with President Emmerson Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga locked in a rivalry that is increasingly manifesting across provincial administrations. This factional conflict represents a critical risk factor for European investors assessing opportunities in the southern African nation, as political instability directly correlates with regulatory unpredictability and operational disruptions.

The tensions between these two figures are not merely personal disagreements but reflect deeper ideological and strategic divisions within ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe's ruling party. Mnangagwa, who consolidated power through a military coup in 2017, has gradually sought to consolidate civilian control and pursue limited economic liberalization policies. Chiwenga, a former military general who orchestrated that 2017 transition, represents the interests of the security apparatus and maintains significant institutional power through military networks. This fundamental tension—between civilian political authority and military-institutional influence—creates unpredictability in policy implementation and enforcement.

The provincial manifestation of this rivalry is particularly concerning for investors. When central political authority becomes fragmented, provincial governors and local administrators begin operating with competing allegiances rather than cohesive governance structures. This fragmentation creates a decentralized policymaking environment where investment frameworks lack consistency. A European manufacturing investor in Bulawayo might face regulatory conditions significantly different from a counterpart in Harare, not due to deliberate provincial policy differentiation, but due to competing power factions issuing contradictory directives.

Zimbabwe's economy, already constrained by currency instability (the Zimbabwean dollar has depreciated dramatically against major currencies), faces additional uncertainty when political leadership is fractious. Foreign direct investment requires predictable institutional frameworks. The World Bank estimates Zimbabwe requires approximately $10 billion in infrastructure investment to rehabilitate core sectors including energy, water, and telecommunications. However, FDI flows have remained anemic precisely because investors cannot confidently project policy stability beyond electoral cycles or internal party transitions.

The rivalry also affects sectoral opportunities differently. The agricultural sector, historically Zimbabwe's economic foundation, depends on clear land tenure policies and input supply consistency. Political factionalism undermines these requirements. Similarly, the mining sector—particularly platinum and lithium extraction, which holds significant potential for European investors seeking supply chain diversification away from Chinese dominance—requires long-term regulatory certainty that competing power centers cannot guarantee.

European investors should note that provincial-level factionalism can actually create unexpected micro-opportunities. Certain provincial administrations may prove more stable than others, or may offer localized investment incentives to attract resources supporting their factional interests. However, these advantages are inherently temporary and come with elevated political risk.

The fundamental question for investors is whether Zimbabwe's institutional weaknesses are sufficiently temporary (resolvable through internal party mechanisms or electoral processes) or whether they signal deeper structural governance failures. Currently, evidence suggests the former, but the projection period remains uncertain, making Zimbabwe appropriate only for investors with substantial risk tolerance or those pursuing opportunistic arbitrage strategies rather than long-term operational investments.