Opinion| Joining too soon: South Sudan, the East African

South Sudan faces mounting pressure to accelerate its accession to the East African Community (EAC), yet policymakers and regional analysts warn that premature membership could expose the fragile nation to destabilising economic and political costs. The debate reflects a deeper tension between South Sudan's aspirations for regional integration and its stark institutional realities: a post-conflict state with limited state capacity, currency instability, and revenue volatility that ill-equips it to meet EAC compliance frameworks.

## Why is South Sudan rushing into EAC membership?

The logic appears straightforward: regional integration promises market access, investment flows, and diplomatic legitimacy. South Sudan has observer status in the EAC and sits within East Africa geographically. Trade corridors with Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia theoretically offer economic lifelines. However, the timing is strategically misaligned. South Sudan's 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement remains fragile, with implementation delays across security sector reform and power-sharing mechanisms. The state lacks the institutional maturity to absorb EAC membership obligations—from tariff harmonisation to customs standardisation—without triggering fiscal shocks or deepening revenue collapse.

## What are the fiscal costs of early accession?

EAC membership demands compliance with a Customs Union protocol and eventual Monetary Union frameworks. For South Sudan, this means surrendering tariff autonomy—a critical revenue lever in an economy where oil export proceeds dominate government income. As petroleum output declines (production fell below 100,000 barrels per day in 2024), non-oil revenues grow proportionally critical. Tariff flexibility allows Juba to protect nascent domestic industries and fund essential services. Under EAC rules, external tariff rates are harmonised across member states, limiting South Sudan's capacity to raise revenue from import duties. With the South Sudanese pound depreciating 40% against the dollar since 2021, currency instability could worsen if monetary policy is constrained by regional convergence criteria.

Additionally, EAC membership triggers infrastructure and institutional investments South Sudan cannot afford. Port access fees at Mombasa, customs modernisation systems, and trade facilitation costs would drain reserves already depleted by civil war and pandemic disruption. Kenya and Uganda, established EAC members, already negotiate preferential rates; South Sudan would absorb full costs without equivalent leverage.

## How do institutional weaknesses compound the risk?

South Sudan's state apparatus remains fragmented across competing centres of power. Tax collection is inefficient; informal economic activity dominates formal channels. The central bank lacks credibility in monetary management—inflation exceeded 50% in 2023. EAC protocols assume functioning tax administrations, transparent customs procedures, and independent central banks. South Sudan meets none reliably. Premature accession would expose these gaps, triggering capital flight, informal trade diversion, and possible suspension if compliance targets are unmet.

Regional peers like Tanzania and Rwanda have weathered integration costs through stronger state capacity and diversified revenue bases. South Sudan has neither. The risk is not membership itself, but timing: joining before institutional consolidation risks becoming a dependent, crisis-prone liability within the bloc rather than a contributor.

Smart accession requires sequencing—first, stabilise the currency and restore oil output; second, rebuild state institutions; third, negotiate transitional protocols that phase tariff harmonisation over 5–10 years. Rushing this timeline serves political optics but courts economic disaster.

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