‘We don’t want any other party except APC’

Nigeria's political landscape deteriorated significantly on March 14, 2026, when armed thugs attacked the African Democratic Congress (ADC) secretariat commissioning ceremony in Bakassi Local Government Area of Cross River State. The incident—characterized by property destruction and physical assault on party members—represents a troubling pattern of pre-election violence that directly undermines investor confidence in the country's institutional stability.

The attack occurred as the ADC attempted to establish its grassroots presence in the oil-rich Cross River region, a state historically dominated by the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC). Witnesses reported that assailants chanted partisan slogans, explicitly stating political exclusion demands. The timing is significant: Nigeria enters the 2027 election cycle with heightened political tensions, and such coordinated disruptions suggest a deliberate campaign to suppress opposition political activity.

For European investors, this incident carries immediate and secondary implications. Cross River State, despite its relative underdevelopment compared to Lagos or Abuja, represents significant untapped potential in agribusiness, forestry, and emerging tourism sectors. Political instability directly correlates with reduced foreign direct investment, delayed project timelines, and elevated operational costs through security overhead. The European Union's Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations with Nigeria implicitly depend on democratic stability—political violence weakens Nigeria's negotiating position and raises questions about the rule of law.

The ADC's marginalization in Cross River is particularly relevant given recent electoral trends. While the APC maintains federal control, state-level competition has intensified, with opposition parties gaining ground in southwestern and southeastern regions. The brazen attack on a political commissioning—a standard democratic activity—signals that some stakeholders view electoral competition as an existential threat rather than a normal democratic process. This psychological shift is more concerning than the immediate violence itself, as it suggests structural fractures in Nigeria's post-2015 democratic consensus.

Bakassi itself warrants attention. The LGA has historically been a flashpoint for cross-border tensions with Cameroon, resource management disputes, and communal conflicts. The superposition of political violence onto existing communal fragility creates a compounding risk environment. Infrastructure projects, supply chains, and workforce recruitment in the area face mounting challenges. Additionally, the state government's apparent inability or unwillingness to prevent such attacks raises questions about security sector accountability—a critical concern for multinational corporations operating under due diligence frameworks.

The broader context matters: Nigeria's security forces are heavily tasked managing insurgencies in the northeast, banditry in the northwest, and communal conflicts in the middle belt. State-level political violence often receives lower prioritization, allowing perpetrators to operate with impunity. This enforcement gap creates moral hazard, incentivizing continued attacks by signaling low consequences.

For European institutional investors, this episode reinforces existing concerns about Nigeria's governance quality. While the country's macroeconomic fundamentals—GDP growth, crude oil exports, fintech innovation—remain relatively attractive, political risk premiums are justified. The ADC attack demonstrates that democratic institutional resilience cannot be taken for granted, even in established democracies by African standards. Risk-averse investors may accelerate capital reallocation to alternative markets with clearer political certainty, while strategic investors may demand higher risk premiums or governance assurances before proceeding with substantial commitments.